Supply/Logistics in Humanitarian Relief Operations
From by Andrew Koech - Unicef
by Andrew Koech
Humanitarian Relief as a world function has always been taken on very short term basis by those tasked to address disasters. Many crises in the world
today have been with us for ages. Sudan, the Middle East and Colombia are
some cases that have been with us for years yet despite of the ongoing and
evolving disaster scenarios, Supply and Logistics, which forms an integral
part of any humanitarian relief scenario, is always the last to be
addressed. More often than not, it becomes a kind of 'cut and paste'
operation that evolves as the crisis evolves. This should never be the case,
each and every crises calling for intervention should be looked at as a
potential that will take a while longer than expeted. In short, plan to
stay, while expecting to exit any moment. This calls for proper services
being put in place as well as the people to offer these services.
Some poorly designed Supply/Logistics systems have led to poor delivery of
services or arrival of services when the need has long been resolved and in
some unfortunate cases deaths have been the toll. If only enough planning is
put in place with a realistic case 'if-then-else' approach factored into the
planning, it might be less problematic during implementation. Of course it
may never be possible to anticipate how a crises will evolve, but it surely
helps to have a plan. For Supply/Logistics, it is not a question of taking
it as it comes. You must plan.
Bureaucracy by both service providers coupled with lethargic service
recipients is always a factor that must be addressed well prior to any
intervention being attempted. If this is neglected serious loses should be
anticipated when the supply line is bogged down. Abilities of the affected
people to meet certain aspects of the relief work must also be ascertained
prior to moving in with a huge operation e.g. can the community be able to
provide skilled labor? Is it a good idea to ask for cost sharing from the
recipients? What method to use to pay for services in the areas of
intevention, food for work or cash? What capacity building can be done to
improve on service delivery? For Supply and Logistics, you may wish to train
local staff in rudimetary supply and logistics for them to be effective and
feel that they too are players in the process.
Page Two
Accountability is another major concern, especially where donor funding is
involved. In the haste to meet the need in the field, accountability is
often a casualty and is only thought of as a last item when donors call for
activity reports in relation to their donations. By this time nothing can be
accounted for, because in the absence of set reporting lines in the
beginning, it becomes very hard at the end to collect data. A good Supply
and Logistics Officer will have to put in place a strict documentation
process that can withstand an audit examination. Proper procurement
procedures, adequate transportation options, Inventory Control Systems in
collections points such as stores/warehoues/cold chains etc and a field
feedback reporting strategy. Signed Waybills returned to sender is always a
good acknowkledgement of delivery of Supplies. Authenticated trip reports is
another good method of keeping tabs on services provided by outside agents.
These documents should be pegged to payment for such services. Without them
no pay.
Finance is perhaps the greatest problem facing Humanitarian Relief Work. For
effective operations to be carried out, the following three areas must be in
place; Skilled Supply/Logistics Personnel, Adequate Resources and Delivery
Infrastructure. Without these being provided, there are bound to be major
problems all round resulting in stress, frustration and no services being
rendered in the intevention areas. This in turn will take on a political
nature and become a point of contention between the Humanitarian service
providers and the recipient authorities resulting in the delay of programme
implementaion.
Page Three
Failure by many donors to factor in a cost component for Supply/Logistics
during appraisal of appeals also causes problems when supplies and services
are procured with no budget to cater for delivery. I have seen quite a
number of shelf-lifed supplies expire in stock while alternate
transportation funding is being sourced.
But perhaps the most damning Supply/Logistics failure is brought about by
programme officers who either because of a poor grasp of the needs in the
field, source for and fail to follow through with clear instructions on what
needs to be done with either the supplies or services. Over-supply and
under-supply is a problem in Humanitarian Relief Work today as seen from
audit reports churned out annually. It helps when Programme staff realise
that Logistics is a programme driven function as far as Humanitarian Work is
concerned. Failure in programmes to order movement of supplies and services
will cause the Supply and Logistics chain to stagnate. High turnover of
Programme staff owing to short term contracts awarded is also a problem area
that renders projects redundant and uncompleted.
Staffing the Supply/Logistics chain with highly skilled personnel must be a
number one concern for Human Resource Officers of any Relief Operation. Many
Humanitarian Relief Operations have ended up employing staff on a
'Who-Knows-Who' basis and in the process cultivated a culture of 'nepotism'.
This is also true in other departments of Humanitarian Work. It is a shame
when a Supply/Logistics job is manned by someone who is either over or
under-qualified. Some factors come into play that are beyond the control of
Humanitarian Relief Senior Managers. Some donors may attach conditions for
their staff to be seconded to the operations even though they may not be
best suited for the job. Others, as mentioned earlier, are clear cases of
nepotism or even racism. It is very crucial to let a professional do it -
always.
In conclusion: The impact of any Humanitarian Relief Operation is dependant
on harmonious coordination between all players. The Humanitarian Relief
Operator, The Benefiary and Civil/military Authorities in the areas of
intevention. But importantly, within the Humanitation Relief organization
itself, there must exist a coordinated effort to do things together. I have
seen one department move to plan its annual operations in exclusion of the
other stake holders and then later turn arround with accusations when things
fail to run smoothly. For example, a department will chart out a program of
action without input from say Supply and Logistics, only later to realize
that the multi-million dollar operation will require a lot more money to
deliver. The seemingly unimportant things at Headquarters are critical in
the field. I remember once reducing a bicycle that weighed 20 kgs from a
plane payload in order to put in a couple of extra vaccine carriers. Later
on when I visited the field I realised the folly of my action. One of the
vaccinators had to walk over bad terrain for miles around lugging on his
head several vaccine carriers. Something which could have been easily
accomplished had the bicyle been there. Once a programme Officer berated me
to send 70 Kgs of hardware material to a certain destination in total
disregard of my advise on cost. When the bill came it amounted 4000 US
dollars! Way beyond the value of the project. Remember, always consider
input from your field staff when planning or before making certain
decisions. It may save you a great deal of trouble and embarassment.
From by Andrew Koech - Unicef
by Andrew Koech
Humanitarian Relief as a world function has always been taken on very short term basis by those tasked to address disasters. Many crises in the world
today have been with us for ages. Sudan, the Middle East and Colombia are
some cases that have been with us for years yet despite of the ongoing and
evolving disaster scenarios, Supply and Logistics, which forms an integral
part of any humanitarian relief scenario, is always the last to be
addressed. More often than not, it becomes a kind of 'cut and paste'
operation that evolves as the crisis evolves. This should never be the case,
each and every crises calling for intervention should be looked at as a
potential that will take a while longer than expeted. In short, plan to
stay, while expecting to exit any moment. This calls for proper services
being put in place as well as the people to offer these services.
Some poorly designed Supply/Logistics systems have led to poor delivery of
services or arrival of services when the need has long been resolved and in
some unfortunate cases deaths have been the toll. If only enough planning is
put in place with a realistic case 'if-then-else' approach factored into the
planning, it might be less problematic during implementation. Of course it
may never be possible to anticipate how a crises will evolve, but it surely
helps to have a plan. For Supply/Logistics, it is not a question of taking
it as it comes. You must plan.
Bureaucracy by both service providers coupled with lethargic service
recipients is always a factor that must be addressed well prior to any
intervention being attempted. If this is neglected serious loses should be
anticipated when the supply line is bogged down. Abilities of the affected
people to meet certain aspects of the relief work must also be ascertained
prior to moving in with a huge operation e.g. can the community be able to
provide skilled labor? Is it a good idea to ask for cost sharing from the
recipients? What method to use to pay for services in the areas of
intevention, food for work or cash? What capacity building can be done to
improve on service delivery? For Supply and Logistics, you may wish to train
local staff in rudimetary supply and logistics for them to be effective and
feel that they too are players in the process.
Page Two
Accountability is another major concern, especially where donor funding is
involved. In the haste to meet the need in the field, accountability is
often a casualty and is only thought of as a last item when donors call for
activity reports in relation to their donations. By this time nothing can be
accounted for, because in the absence of set reporting lines in the
beginning, it becomes very hard at the end to collect data. A good Supply
and Logistics Officer will have to put in place a strict documentation
process that can withstand an audit examination. Proper procurement
procedures, adequate transportation options, Inventory Control Systems in
collections points such as stores/warehoues/cold chains etc and a field
feedback reporting strategy. Signed Waybills returned to sender is always a
good acknowkledgement of delivery of Supplies. Authenticated trip reports is
another good method of keeping tabs on services provided by outside agents.
These documents should be pegged to payment for such services. Without them
no pay.
Finance is perhaps the greatest problem facing Humanitarian Relief Work. For
effective operations to be carried out, the following three areas must be in
place; Skilled Supply/Logistics Personnel, Adequate Resources and Delivery
Infrastructure. Without these being provided, there are bound to be major
problems all round resulting in stress, frustration and no services being
rendered in the intevention areas. This in turn will take on a political
nature and become a point of contention between the Humanitarian service
providers and the recipient authorities resulting in the delay of programme
implementaion.
Page Three
Failure by many donors to factor in a cost component for Supply/Logistics
during appraisal of appeals also causes problems when supplies and services
are procured with no budget to cater for delivery. I have seen quite a
number of shelf-lifed supplies expire in stock while alternate
transportation funding is being sourced.
But perhaps the most damning Supply/Logistics failure is brought about by
programme officers who either because of a poor grasp of the needs in the
field, source for and fail to follow through with clear instructions on what
needs to be done with either the supplies or services. Over-supply and
under-supply is a problem in Humanitarian Relief Work today as seen from
audit reports churned out annually. It helps when Programme staff realise
that Logistics is a programme driven function as far as Humanitarian Work is
concerned. Failure in programmes to order movement of supplies and services
will cause the Supply and Logistics chain to stagnate. High turnover of
Programme staff owing to short term contracts awarded is also a problem area
that renders projects redundant and uncompleted.
Staffing the Supply/Logistics chain with highly skilled personnel must be a
number one concern for Human Resource Officers of any Relief Operation. Many
Humanitarian Relief Operations have ended up employing staff on a
'Who-Knows-Who' basis and in the process cultivated a culture of 'nepotism'.
This is also true in other departments of Humanitarian Work. It is a shame
when a Supply/Logistics job is manned by someone who is either over or
under-qualified. Some factors come into play that are beyond the control of
Humanitarian Relief Senior Managers. Some donors may attach conditions for
their staff to be seconded to the operations even though they may not be
best suited for the job. Others, as mentioned earlier, are clear cases of
nepotism or even racism. It is very crucial to let a professional do it -
always.
In conclusion: The impact of any Humanitarian Relief Operation is dependant
on harmonious coordination between all players. The Humanitarian Relief
Operator, The Benefiary and Civil/military Authorities in the areas of
intevention. But importantly, within the Humanitation Relief organization
itself, there must exist a coordinated effort to do things together. I have
seen one department move to plan its annual operations in exclusion of the
other stake holders and then later turn arround with accusations when things
fail to run smoothly. For example, a department will chart out a program of
action without input from say Supply and Logistics, only later to realize
that the multi-million dollar operation will require a lot more money to
deliver. The seemingly unimportant things at Headquarters are critical in
the field. I remember once reducing a bicycle that weighed 20 kgs from a
plane payload in order to put in a couple of extra vaccine carriers. Later
on when I visited the field I realised the folly of my action. One of the
vaccinators had to walk over bad terrain for miles around lugging on his
head several vaccine carriers. Something which could have been easily
accomplished had the bicyle been there. Once a programme Officer berated me
to send 70 Kgs of hardware material to a certain destination in total
disregard of my advise on cost. When the bill came it amounted 4000 US
dollars! Way beyond the value of the project. Remember, always consider
input from your field staff when planning or before making certain
decisions. It may save you a great deal of trouble and embarassment.
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